Swedish Joint Committee for Literary and
Artistic Professionals presents
World conference on culture
World
Conference on Culture
| Programme
Conference Papers
Russia in Search of New Identity
Art Identifies Conflict
Oleysa Turkina
| Oleysa Turkina |
Go there,
I don’t know where.
Bring it,
I don’t know what.From a Russian folk-tale
Contemporary cultural conflict in Russia is connected with the crisis of collective identity, engendered by the principal political, economic, social, aesthetic changes which have occurred over the last decade, when one symbolic order which dominated earlier was replaced by many, when the social links broke apart which had permitted the individual to identify himself with one group or idea or another. Today, instead of a multitude of new orders (or «new dis-order») which co-existed during the transitional period, once again a single order has become firmly established, and one which is oriented toward the Past. Thus the disintegration of the previous collective memory has been compensated for by the return to «tradition»; the repudiation of Soviet symbols leads to the restoration of that symbolism which was the symbol of Russia over the period of several centuries; the impossibility of creating one’s own normative ideas - to an appeal to the Russian religious philosophy of the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th; the discontinuity of historical development - to the establishment of parallels to earlier historical periods (all the way back to paganism); dissatisfaction with the criminal-romanticist image of the new Russia, fabricated by the Western mass media - to a negative and even aggressive stance with regard to foreign cultures and so on. The main role in the process of a new identification is played by the replacement of futurological tendencies, compromised by Soviet ideology (which had betrayed the expectations of individuals who had identified with it), by the total reorientation toward the Past, toward «tradition», however diverse the meaning of this concept might be for different groups of the population. Also contributing to such a turn toward the Past is the fact that, on the one hand, regression toward more archaic values is characteristic for a crisis of personal identity; and on the other hand the official following of this or that «tradition» (in particular, the tradition of «old» Russia) advances as an alternative to totalitarian ideology, so attractive in moments of crisis for the collective identity. Both the individual and the society as a whole, by means of turning to the Past, have the chance to reject reality, fleeing not so much the future as the present, investing their feeling of guilt and responsibility in the pliant, safe Past. It is no wonder that the mass media, in the person of their representatives, more and more often call for people to „repent", carry out an act of nation-wide (collective) penitence before the Past, thus through transferring the sense of guilt to the Past, «to freeze» the symbolic whole.
Identification with a certain tradition requires visible confirmation and finds it, for example, in grandiose forms such as the restored Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow. The Past is literally reconstructed, effacing the present, and providing stabilisation by means of suspending time. This strategy is demonstrated in particular by a television advertisement which is related to the Cathedral, in which an emigrant, returning to Russia after being away for a long time, turns to the tour guide who declares the Cathedral to be a symbol of the new Russia: «you shouldn’t divide Russia into old and new - Russia is one», that is, if everything is restored as it was before, there is no more time. Today, such singular «restorationist» conservatism is the government’s official policy in many areas. One of the most striking examples of collective identification with the Past, thanks to which the concept itself entered actively into the Russian mass media, is the identification of the remains of the last Russian tsar, Nicholas II and his family and their servants, shot by the Bolsheviks in 1918 in Yekaterinburg. First discovered in 1991, over the Past six years they have been subjected to careful identification, including DNA tests. Identifications play a special role here, since in case the remains are genuine, they become an object of collective worship, which permits the participants to ascribe it to a certain heroic myth (the myth of tsarist Russia). Typically, it is just the identification which becomes the most important question in connection with the planned interment, thus the Orthodox public appealed to the government, with the request that an additional scientific expert examination be carried out, in order to definitively identify the remains and not permit the interment of «pseudo-relics», and the Holy Synod proposed placing the remains in a temporary, symbolic grave up to the time of absolutely reliable identification. The deeply archaic belief in the power of relics (the remains of holy martyrs, since parallel to that the question arises of the canonisation of Tsar Nicholas II and members of his family as martyrs, who have already been canonised by the Russian church abroad) requires the confirmation of their authenticity by a scientific expert examination, and no logical contradiction of any kind is seen here in the mixing of religious and scientific discourses. If the image of the tsar’s family is re-established through burial, through reconstruction of traditional symbolic space which allows the participants in the ceremony to equate themselves with a certain symbolic sphere of «old» new Russia (if the burial still takes place as planned on 17 July 1998 in St. Petersburg’s Peter and Paul Fortress, then it will be an important state act), then a similar cultural gesture should obliterate the other image - the image of Lenin (the symbol of revolutionary Russia), whose burial has also been discussed from time to time recently by the government. And, if one image is restored by means of burial, then the other, through the same procedure, is consigned to oblivion. Thus, both a demonstration of something hidden at one time (the remains of the tsar’s family), and the concealment of what was put on display (Lenin’s body in the mausoleum), each in its own way serves to stop time, excluded from the space of the new identification. The identification in the mass consciousness also is connected with military operations, for example, the identification of the soldiers who died in Chechnya is being carried out, that is, it actually comes down to two institutions of collective identification: the church and the army.
A deliberate return to a more archaic model on the state level seems the safest one at a time of destabilisation. However, it does not exclude conflicts, which arise on the border - on the border of faith (every «state» religion is authoritarian), on the border of scientific and mythological discourses (even in that case when the questions intertwine), and, finally, on the border of different types of activity.
What is the role of artists in this situation of total self-determination, when social processes are so dynamic that life turns out to be more „avant garde than an art even in its conservative manifestations? The aspiration to stabilise things into a „frozen state" of the symbolic sphere at the external level reveals itself in the rise of the new artistic establishment. This new establishment is distinguished from the earlier Soviet one (despite the fact that Zurab Tsereteli, its official leader and president of the Academy of Arts, is a recognised Soviet sculptor) in that its representatives are actively participating in the creation of a new ideology. While the ideological shell has still not hardened, it is possible to see in what way it is taking shape, since over time, works of art which were executed according to the social order have turned into ideological artefacts and become invisible. The main area of the state order is the installation of public monuments in the national capital, Moscow, where during the last few years, for example, they have installed a memorial to Marshal Zhukov, the hero of the Great Patriotic War (World War II) (by the sculptor Klykov), a memorial to Peter I, and a sculpture group of folk-tale characters on Manezh Square (Tsereteli). In the choice of heroes and the stylistic particularities of these monuments there is an obvious orientation toward certain historical periods, with which the population identifies, and which are most painlessly assimilated by the „collective unconscious" of the citizens of new Russia. The new mythology of public space is formed by means of the re-appropriation of neo-classical tendencies of the 19th century, «national colour» of folk-tale heroes and consumer luxury of the Westernised business centres (the ensemble on Manezh Square with the „Okhotnie Ryadi").
Work with the collective codes is not the exclusive privilege of representatives of the artistic establishment, in its own way, it is conducted by those artists who actively participated in forming the sphere of visual images in the transitional period, representing post-Soviet art in the context of international contemporary art.
Thus the artist Timur Novikov cleverly confirmed the appearance of «new Russian classicism», classicism for «new Russians», oriented toward a broad spectrum of the traditions of the European tradition from ancient Greek art to the 19th century salons (for this movement the self-reflection is characteristic, for example, the artist Aidan Salakhova not only produces «beautiful images», but also demonstrates how they «live» in «new Russian» interiors, sometimes being burned by lighting fixtures). Timur Novikov explains this, first, by the rebirth of interest in «traditional values», which manifests itself especially clearly in St. Petersburg, which is not only a classical city which is conserved in the architectural forms of the 18th-19th centuries, it is a centre of the antiques trade; second, by the domination of the classical image in contemporary advertising; third, by the commercial success of classical art; fourth, by the distinctive renaissance in contemporary art with the new dictate of the beautiful image in it. The mass media have different interpretations of Novikov’s «neo-academicism» movement from the accusation of fascism (the artist Georgii Guryanov, who approved of the visual images of the 1930s), and taking advantage of homoerotic discourse (the artists Oleg Maslov and Viktor Kuznetsov who appeal to the late Roman aesthetics) to confirmation of «neo-academicism» as the most adequate new Russian art (in the person of Olga Tobreluts, to whom the fantasy writer Bruce Sterling dedicated the following lines: «Russia is in bad straits, but I will swear with my hand on a UNIX bible that when Olga Tobreluts enters the room, the image-crunching jockeys at Industrial Light & Magic ought to genuflect and spit up holy water» - from «Art and Corruption», Wired 6.01. January, 1998, p.140)
Artists not only react to the character of borrowed images - objects of collective identification, but also demonstrate by what principle this borrowing proceeds. New objects, ideas are formed according to the associative principle, where one generates another without any logical connection. Sergey Bugaev Afrika, directly employing artefacts of the departed ideological epoch, recombines the symbolic orders according to the principle which he metaphorically calls «aphasiac», that is, meaning words and images which do not coincide. Thus simultaneously with the formation of the new state symbolism of Russia, from 1991 to 1995 he creates a series of works, «Flags», in which he adds, directly to the Soviet symbols, images which he has borrowed from various semiospheres. The multi-layered character of his installations (such as in the exhibition «Evolution of the Image» in the State Russian Museum, for example, where against the background of the relief by Segej Konenkov, «Monument to the Victims of the Revolution», created in 1917 for the Senate Tower in the Kremlin, the artist installed a post-constructivist metallic sphere, with a pendulum placed inside it, which he made from a fragment of one of the most famous ideological sculptures of Vera Mukhina, «Worker and Collective Farm Woman», 1937), acquires special significance in the context of the interpenetration of various political, economic, visual discourses, which remained transparent during the time of the transitional period. Today the artist is tormented by «the degree of inadequacy in the process of reidentification which did not take place in a brotherly way». In contrast to the masses, who perceived the fantasy character of the recited events as reality, he realises the illusory nature of the concepts functioning on Russian territory, where «The myth of democracy acquired an obsessive character and was realised in a form oriented toward the unconscious, and not in real democracy with deputies and elections. In this lies the specific character of our collective identification. In this connection Russia is very advantageous from the viewpoint of demonstrating the unconscious -from the individual to the collective - from the wolf-man, who could still be called «Dr. Sigmund Freud’s Russian patient» to the concept of our Soviet Homeland, including diverse multi-ethnic structures» (the words of S. Bugaev). Regression to the Past on the level of state ideology is subject to the artist’s criticism for taking «the position that «time stopped» connected to the fact that we already took everything and we don’t want to give more to anyone, which we will be compelled to do, if once again something happens, if once again we will work over the chart of the collective unconscious... The interests of Russia’s new ruling class coincide with the interests of the world community, which we can call «the Om Shinrikyo syndrome». The appearance of new gods, new leaders is not desirable... And the interests of the world community coincide on the point that there should be no redistribution of oil or congregation.» (from the conversation with S. Bugaev)
Artists make a diagnosis of the epoch while themselves surviving its diseases. One of these «diseases» is Multiple Personality Disorder, not only related to childhood trauma, but evidently aggravated by the transition from one cultural paradigm to another. The change of identity becomes the artistic strategy of Vladislav Mamyshev, famous as Monroe in connection with one of his most successful reincarnations, as the actress Marilyn Monroe.
Having begun his artistic activity in the mid-1980s, the artist in succession was reincarnated as Adolf Hitler, Marilyn Monroe, Lenin, Napoleon, Joan of Arc, Dracula, Ivan the Tsarevich, etc., and described his artistic strategy as the desire of «through my subjective personality, through all my psychical and mental mechanisms to embody mankind in all its variety, experience all these destinies myself, take on myself all these countless sins, neutralise these countless good deeds, eliminate sexual, national, social and other differences and remain myself in this singular variety» (from «Where the heck am I? Where are my things?», Kabinet. An Anthology. Inapress, Saint Petersburg, The Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam, 1997, p.109).
Evidently it is no accident that one of the first images was Hitler, on which, as on a negatively ludicrous example, a childish identity was constructed in the Soviet Union. All children who were brought up on Soviet cinematography used to play at «Fascists»; parodied the words of patriotic songs from the time of the Second World War, German, American, and Russian - they were the heroes of anecdotes connected to national identification. However, Mamyshev reincarnated himself as Hitler much later, and at first he simply drew Hitler in a school notebook, for which he was accused by the school teacher of being obsessed with «fascism». It was impossible even to suppose that in the 1990s during the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the victory over Fascism, they would openly sell the book «Mein Kampf», on Palace Square in St. Petersburg and in one of Russia’s villages adolescents would appear in German uniforms from the time of the Second World War, and replace the name Ivan with Hans. If in a stable semiosphere the figure of Hitler was unambiguously negative, then in a time of semantic disorientation it seemed to acquire a certain ambivalence.
Identification with one or the other personage may be perceived as the personality’s defensive mechanism at the moment when the collective or personal identity is lost, as a peculiar therapy of possible multiple-personality disorder. The reincarnation as Marilyn Monroe preceded the sudden fascination with this image after Vladislav Mamyshev viewed the feature film «Some Like It Hot»: «Seeing that I was reaching puberty, many ascribed my passion to the category of powerful sexual upheavals. My mother even took me to a psychiatrist in order to correct my libido. The psychiatrist and my friends asked me whether I was jerking off with her picture. This way of putting the question literally nonplussed me. It was anything but sex that interested me in this woman. Sometimes I thought that she was my mother, sometimes that she was my god» (from «Where the heck am I? Where are my things?», Kabinet. An Anthology. Inapress, Saint Petersburg, The Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam, 1997, p.111). Incorporating within himself the beloved object, however successfully the artist reincarnated Marilyn Monroe in his performances, photographs, pictures, television broadcasts and video films, that, however, did not bring him to change his sexual identity (in one of the photographs that portrays Marilyn Monroe wearing a skirt lifted up by a gust of wind, the artist showed his penis). It is characteristic of the artist that he does not lose his personal identity, and the combination within himself of many historical heroes, leaders - sources of collective identification. After Hitler and Monroe - basic personages who represent for Mamyshev opposite beginnings - man and woman, evil and good, he creates in 1991 «Members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union» - real Soviet ideological figures - men who were transformed by him into women. Several years later portraits of historical personages appear: Lenin, Catherine II, Napoleon, Joan of Arc, Dracula, and finally the heroes of Russian folk tales. The images of Ivan the Tsarevich, Morozko and other folk-tale personages, who are created by the artist almost at the same time that Tsereteli’s sculpture groups appear on Manezh Square, in their own way reflect the turn of Russia’s national self-identity toward exotic mythology highly valued both by the domestic Russian consumers of this mythology and by the external Western cultural market.
The destruction of social ideals and the inability of the individual to adapt to the new conditions evoke a fervent desire to find a model with which to identify. In Russia, where they still were unsuccessful in forming a sufficiently powerful cultural industry which would replace the Father in the consumer society, the search for him continues. At the start of the transitional period, the Father is sent off to the West, from where he is supposed to be about to return. «Western» political, economic and aesthetic models are perceived as «domestic». The semiosphere is actively saturated with words and images from outside, bearing simultaneously the illusion of liberation and stability (from the word «president», as a symbol of democracy, to the image of the Statue of Liberty, with Tampax in her hand, as a symbol of freedom). However, over time, the conviction comes that the Father is here, but died long ago, the grave of this Fore-father, «tradition», a resurrected new «old» Russia are becoming a place of national identification, it is not by chance that the funeral ceremonies acquire such important national status. Restored as the «genuine» Past, the order carries a character of fantasy. The Past is saturated with mythological personages, heroes - from the first cosmonaut, Yurii Gagarin, to Ivan the Tsarevich, of the folk-tales - used by individuals in the desire to obtain an object which they can emulate. The personages are being reproduced both by the creators of the new ideological establishment and by artists who maintain a critical position with regard to the emerging state ideology. Simulating the main elements of the collective ritual, the artists nevertheless distance themselves from it. A parody still arises while not yet working in the destabilised symbolic order.
Oleysa Turkina